Re: [CBLX] es-ce la parade de la Linux Foundation ? UEFI Secure Boot System for Open Source

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merci pour cette article, interressant tout ca!
----- Message d'origine ----- De : "Ald0" <info@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
À : "C B L X" <carrefourblinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Envoyé : 1 décembre 2012 17:14
Objet : [CBLX] es-ce la parade de la Linux Foundation ? UEFI Secure Boot System for Open Source


Es-ce (hormis là où l'on peut encore mettre ce mode "off" dans le BIOS) LA
parade de la Linux Foundation contre l'UEFI et ses (dé)limitations ?
Le "present user"-test (cf. info) sera-t-il utilisable sans intervention
nécessitant par ex. une quelconque action impossible à effectuer par une
personne dv ?

URL:
http://www.linuxfoundation.org/news-media/blogs/browse/2012/10/linux-foundation-uefi-secure-boot-system-open-source

Linux Foundation UEFI Secure Boot System for Open Source

  By James Bottomley - October 10, 2012 - 1:53pm

  Guest post from James Bottomley, Linux Foundation Technical Advisory
  Board

  I'm pleased to announce that the [*]Linux Foundation and its
  [*]Technical Advisory Board have produced a plan to enable the Linux
  (and indeed all Open Source based distributions) to continue operating
  as Secure Boot enabled systems roll out.  In a nutshell, the Linux
  Foundation will obtain a Microsoft Key and sign a small pre-bootloader
  which will, in turn, chain load (without any form of signature check) a
  predesignated boot loader which will, in turn, boot Linux (or any other
  operating system). The pre-bootloader will employ a “present user” test
  to ensure that it cannot be used as a vector for any type of UEFI
  malware to target secure systems. This pre-bootloader can be used
  either to boot a CD/DVD installer or LiveCD distribution or even boot
  an installed operating system in secure mode for any distribution that
  chooses to use it.  The process of obtaining a Microsoft signature will
  take a while, but once it is complete, the pre-bootloader will be
  placed on the Linux Foundation website for anyone to download and make
  use of.

Philosophy Behind this Announcement

  The Linux Foundation is committed to giving users freedom of choice on
  their platforms.  Conforming to this stance, we have already published
  a variety of tools to permit users to take control of their secure boot
  platforms by replacing the Platform Key and managing (or replacing) the
  installed Key Exchange Keys [*]here.  However, as one of the enablers
  of the Linux ecosystem, the Foundation recognizes that not everyone is
  willing (or able) to do this so it was also necessary to find a
  solution that would enable people to continue to try out Linux and
  other Open Source Operating Systems in spite of the barriers UEFI
  Secure boot would place in their way and without requiring that they
  understand how to take control of their platforms.  Therefore, we also
  formulated a technical plan, which is implemented in this
  pre-bootloader, to allow distributions to continue functioning in a
  secure boot environment.

  The current pre-bootloader is designed as an enabler only in that, by
  breaking the security verification chain at the actual bootloader, it
  provides no security enhancements over booting linux with UEFI secure
  boot turned off.  Its sole purpose is to allow Linux to continue to
  boot on platforms that come by default with secure boot enabled.  The
  Linux Foundation welcomes efforts by some of the major distributions
  (e.g. [*]Fedora, [*]SUSE and [*]Ubuntu) to tackle the problem of
  taking full advantage of UEFI secure boot to enhance platform security
  and sees the pre-bootloader it is releasing as a stop-gap measure that
  will give all distributions time to come up with plans that take
  advantage of UEFI secure boot.

Technical Details

  The source code for the pre-bootloader is available in

  [*]git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/efitools.git

  As Loader.c

  It is designed to be as small as possible, leaving all the work to the
  real bootloader.  The real bootloader must be installed on the same
  partition as the pre-bootloader with the known path loader.efi
  (although the binary may be any bootloader including Grub2).  The
  pre-bootloader will attempt to execute this binary and, if that
  succeeds, the system will boot normally.  If the loader.efi fails to
  load with a security error (because it is unsigned), the pre-bootloader
  will stop at a splash screen and ask the user to confirm, by selecting
  a menu option, that they wish to continue booting loader.efi.  If this
  confirmation (which is the “present user” test) is successful, the
  pre-bootloader will then execute loader.efi without security
  verification (if the user denies permission to boot, the pre-bootloader
  will signal failure and the UEFI boot sequence will continue on to the
  next boot path, if there is one).  To facilitate repeat booting (and to
  make the pre-bootloader useful for booting hard disks as well as USB
  keys or DVDs) the pre-bootloader will also check to see if the platform
  is booting in Setup Mode and if it is, will ask the user for permission
  to install the signature of loader.efi into the authorized signatures
  database.  If the user gives permission, the signature will be
  installed and loader.efi will then boot up without any present user
  tests on all subsequent occasions even after the platform is placed
  back into secure boot mode.  The present user test splash screen that
  appears in secure boot mode asking for permission to boot loader.efi
  will also direct the user to a Linux Foundation website where we will
  gather details of how to place platforms in setup mode and advise the
  user how to do this, either to install the signature of loader.efi or
  to take full control of the platform by replacing the Platform and Key
  Exchange Keys.
    * [*]jejb's blog
    * [*]Print
    * [*]Email

Refs:
...
 * http://www.linux-foundation.org/
 * http://www.linuxfoundation.org/programs/advisory-councils/tab
* http://blog.hansenpartnership.com/easier-way-to-take-control-of-uefi-secure-boot-platform/
 * http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/12368.html
 * https://www.suse.com/blogs/uefi-secure-boot-details/
 * https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2012-June/035445.html
 * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/efitools.git
 * http://www.linuxfoundation.org/blogs/jejb
 * http://www.linuxfoundation.org/print/9644
 * http://www.linuxfoundation.org/printmail/9644
...

Aldo:~$


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